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The purpose of this study is to find empirical evidence of the influencing of 
investment opportunity set, free cash flow, corporate governance, and firm 
size on debt policy of Indonesian public listed companies. Based on the 
purposive sampling method, 52 observations were selected as a sample of 
this study.   
 
This study found that investment opportunity set negatively influence debt 
policy. It means if the growth of company is high, the agency problem 
tends to be low, because the companies’ free cash flow is low, and 
therefore, the control with debt policy was not needed. This study also 
found that corporate governance positively influence to debt policy. It 
means that the better corporate governance practice lead to increase debt 
because of easier to get funding supplier. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that conflict of interest between managers and owners 
or agency problems occurs when the manager and owner are different parties, or when 
managers do not control 100% stake. Agency problems tend to increase with decrease in 
the portion of shares owned by managers. Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) state 
that the manager hired by shareholders to manage the company with the objective to 
increase shareholder wealth. However, managers are more likely to make decisions and 
take action to maximize its interests are often not align with shareholder wealth.  
 
Agency problems can be reduced in several ways including through the implementation 
of debt policy. The use of debt policy as a mechanism for reducing or controlling agency 
problems is influenced by several factors, such as the investment opportunities set, free 
cash flow, corporate governance mechanisms, and firm size. Investment opportunity set 
shows the company's growth opportunities. Growth companies tend to use more funding 
sources from their own capital or equity rather than debt. (Gul, 1999; Jaggi & Gul, 1999; 
Kallapur & Trombley, 2001; Jones & Sharma, 2001). In the context of Indonesians, 
Lestari (2004) found that the investment opportunities set negatively affect debt policy. It 
means that companies with high growth tend to have smaller levels of debt. While 
Puspitasari and Gumanti (2005) concluded that the investment opportunity set positively 
effect debt policy.  
 
Other factors that also affect debt policy is the free cash flow. Jensen (1986) defines free 
cash flow as cash remaining after the enterprise fund all projects that generate positive net 
present value. Companies with excess free cash flow will have a better performance than 
other firms, because the company can make a profit on the various opportunities that may 
not be obtained any other company. Firms with high free cash flow are considered more 
survive in a bad situation.  
 
Free cash flow theory predicts that increased amounts of debt will increase firm value 
because the agency costs related to free cash flow tends to decrease. This is a 
consequence of the ability of corporate debt policy to control the use of free cash flow in 
excess (Howton, Howton & Perfect, 1996). Jaggi and Gull (1999) found that free cash 
flow positive effect on debt policy for firms with low growth opportunities.  
 
Good corporate governance (GCG) is also an important factor to be considered in the 
debt policy decisions. GCG is expected to serve as a tool to give confidence to investors 
that they would receive a return on the funds they have invested. Black, Jang and Kim 
(2003); Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Harford (2005) found that the negative 
relationship between debt policy and quality of corporate governance. While Durnev and 
Kim (2003) actually found that the practice of corporate governance and disclosure have 
a positive influence on external financing. Hadrat and Pujiastuti (2007) also states that the 
quality of corporate governance had significantly positive impact on debt policy.  
 
Company size is also a factor affecting corporate debt policy. Several studies provide 
evidence supporting a positive relationship between firm size and debt policy (Moh'd, 
Perry and Rimbey, 1998; Brigham and Gapenski, 1999; Soliha and Taswan, 2002). The 
relationship becomes stronger for larger firms than small firms with low growth 
opportunities (Jaggi & Gul, 1999).  
 
This study aims to examine the effect of the investment opportunity set, free cash flow, 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
 
2.1. Investment Opportunity Set and Debt Policy  
Investment opportunity set (IOS) is an investment option in the future and reflects the 
growth in assets and equity. According to Gaver and Gaver (1993), IOS is the enterprise 
value the amount of which depends on the specified expenses of management in the 
future. IOS is also the investment choices that will hopefully generate a greater return. 
IOS can only be measured by using a proxy. According Kallapur and Trombley (2001), in 
general, proxies IOS can be classified into four types, namely:  
1. Price –Based Proxy  
2. Investment – Based Proxy 
3. Variant – Based Proxy 
4. Combination of individual proxy  
 
Based on the proxies, we can determine the level of company growth. Jaggi and Gul 
(1999) found that firms with low growth rate would be more likely to increase debt. It is 
based on the premise that the company will utilize free cash flow available to invest in 
projects with positive net present value. Conversely Myers (1977) in Lestari (2004) states 
that companies with high growth rates are more likely to reduce the level of debt. It is 
based on the notion that increasing levels of corporate debt will be higher the likelihood 
the company was declared bankrupt by the debt holders if unable to pay debts. 
Furthermore, Myers (1977) states that companies with high growth rates are more likely 
not to add debt due to underinvestment and asset-substitution.  
 
Underinvestment problem is the situation when a manager is more likely to invest in 
projects that have positive net present value. The problem arose because managers think 
that the debt holders is a party that has first claim on cash flows derived from the project. 
While the asset substitution problem occurs when managers are opportunistic replace the 
higher variance assets with lower variance assets, by increasing debt. Jaggi and Gul 
(1999) states that the investment opportunities set negatively affect debt policy.  
H 1: investment opportunities set negatively affect debt policy  
 
 
2.2. Free Cash Flow and Debt Policy  
Jensen (1986) defines free cash flow as cash remaining after all projects that generate 
positive net present value discounted at the relevant level of capital costs. Free cash flow 
is generally described as all cash generated by operations that can be distributed back to 
shareholders without affecting the current growth rate (Jokipii and Vahama, 2006).  
Various conditions can affect the company's free cash flow value. If the company has a 
high free cash flow with low growth rates of free cash flow then this should be distributed 
to shareholders. If a firm has a high free cash flow and growth rates of free cash flow is 
high then this can be detained temporarily and can be used for investment in future 
periods.  
 
Large free cash flow will lead to the manager's behavior is wrong and bad decisions, 
which are not for the benefit of shareholders. In other words, the managers have a 
tendency to use excess profits to consumption and opportunistic behavior of others 
because they receive the full benefits of these activities but they are less willing to take 
risk of costs incurred.  
 
Debt policy can be used to control the use of free cash flow excessive by the manager. In 
addition shareholders will also enjoy more control over his management team for 
example, if a company issuing new debt and use the proceeds to repurchase common 
shares outstanding management is obliged to pay cash to cover this debt, simultaneously 
reducing the amount of cash flow available to management to be mocked. With the debt, 
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management will work more efficiently in order to avoid financial failure so as to avoid a 
wasted investment (Jensen (1986).  
 
Agarwal and Jayaraman (1994) in Jaggi and Gul (1999) states that companies with high 
free cash flow (FCF) and low set of investment opportunities will have higher levels of 
debt because the debt would reduce the agency problem associated with high FCF. 
Megginson (1997) in Mahadwarta (2002) states that dividend policy affects the debt with 
a positive relationship. Companies that distribute dividends in bulk require additional 
funds through debt to finance its investment.  
H 2: Free cash flow positively affect debt policy.  
 
2.3. Corporate Governance and Debt Policy  
The concept of corporate governance can be defined as a series of mechanisms to direct 
and control an enterprise that runs its operations in accordance with the expectations of 
the stakeholders. The concept of corporate governance developed along with the demands 
of the public who want a realization of the business life of a healthy, clean and 
responsible. This demand is actually a public response to the increasingly widespread 
cases of corporate irregularities around the world.  
 
Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI) defines corporate governance as "a 
set of rules that regulate relations between shareholders, management companies, lenders, 
governments, employees and stakeholders internal and external relating to the rights and 
obligations or in other words a system that controls the company ". The main purpose of 
corporate governance is to create added value for all interested parties or stakeholders 
(FCGI, 2003).  
 
IICG defines corporate governance as processes and structures implemented in running 
the company with the primary objective increasing shareholder value over the long term 
by taking into account the interests of other stakeholders. Corporate governance problems 
can be traced from the development of agency theory that tries to explain how the parties 
involved in the company (managers, owners and creditors) will behave, because they 
basically have different interests.  
 
IICG GCG conducted a survey of practices implemented by the company and resulted in 
a score of Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI). CGPI measures the extent to 
which companies meet the rules of corporate governance role in the implementation of 
the seven criteria: (a) the company's commitment to CG, (b) implementation of the GMS 
and its treatment of minority shareholders, including timely implementation of the GMS 
and the guarantee of protection of shareholder rights, (c ) board of commissioners, its 
board of commissioners who are competent in their field and how optimal roles and 
responsibilities in the administration of CG, (d) the structure of the board of directors, its 
directors who are competent in their field as well as how roles and responsibilities of 
directors in the implementation of good corporate governance; (e) relations with 
stakeholders, how the relations and corporate responsibility with the parties associated 
with the company, (f) transparency and accountability, requires that any information that 
is open, timely, clear, comparable especially with regard to financial issues, management 
and ownership company; (f) in response to research IICG, the extent of the seriousness of 
the respondent to follow this research.  
 
Implementation of Corporate Governance (CG) in a company brings many benefits. One 
of them according to FCGI, by performing the CG, some of the benefits to be had, among 
others:  
1. Improve corporate performance through the creation process of making better 
decisions, improve operational efficiency and further enhance the company's 
services to stakeholders.  
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2. Facilitate obtaining a cheaper financing fund that ultimately enhances corporate 
value.  
3. Restore investor confidence to invest in Indonesia.  
4. Shareholders will be satisfied with the performance of the company as well as to 
enhance shareholder's value and dividends.  
 
In addition to managing corporate funds from shareholders, the company also manages 
the fund manager of the bondholders or a creditor. Conflicts of interest between managers 
and the bondholder happened in terms of debt policy. This conflict arises when 
management took the projects that have a greater risk than predicted by the creditor. In 
this case the creditors are not harmed if funds would be invested in high-risk projects, 
because it will increase the risk of bankruptcy a company that will ultimately affect the 
value of a company with declining market value of debt or bonds that have not matured. 
Conversely, if high-risk projects that provide great results, the compensation received by 
creditors in the form of interest not rise. This shows that the debt can make the transfer of 
wealth from the bondholder to the shareholders that will be avoided by the bondholder.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested using increased debt to reduce agency costs, 
although for different reasons, namely that outside equity is not increased so that the 
conflict between outside investors and the management did not increase. Chen and 
Steiner (1999) concluded that managerial ownership and debt policy has a negative 
relationship. This is due to factor substitution between the two. In addition, the high-risk 
conditions managers choose high-risk projects with the purpose of obtaining a high 
return. Risk reduction is done by using debt financing from lenders. However, the use of 
debt at high risk levels can reduce the agency costs of equity but can lead to agency costs 
of debt.  
 
Black, Jang and Kim (2003); Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Harford (2005) 
suggested a negative relationship between debt policy and quality of corporate 
governance. While Durnev and Kim (2003) it mentions the existence of positive relations 
firm selection will practice corporate governance and disclosure to the company's need 
for external financing. Hadrat and Pujiastuti (2007) also mentioned that the quality of 
corporate governance has a positive influence significantly the debt policy. This suggests 
that the better the quality of the implementation of corporate governance will further 
increase the debt policy.  
 
Application of the better corporate governance makes companies increasingly trusted by 
the creditors, investors and other partners. Therefore, the funding originating from 
companies that debt will increase because the company has been trusted lenders so that 
access to funding sources of debt becomes easier. Although the proportion of corporate 
debt increases, shareholders will not be worried because the company that the application 
of corporate governance both will run the principle of transparency, accountability, 
responsibility, independence and fairness and equality. Principles are used to determine 
the value IICG Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI).  
H 3: index of corporate governance has a positive effect on debt policy.  
 
2.4. Firm size and Debt Policy  
According Sujianto (2001) firm size indicated by total assets, total sales, the average total 
sales and average total assets. In this case the sale is greater than the variable costs and 
fixed costs, you will get the amount of income before taxes. Conversely, if sales are 
smaller than the variable costs and fixed costs, the company will suffer losses.  
 
In general, large enterprises are more diverse and tend to have low levels of bankruptcy 
or financial difficulties than small once, it makes them to have easier access to capital 
markets, particularly bond markets. Moreover, another important thing from a big 
company that is comprised of Assets-in-place, which allow them to publish a higher level 
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of debt. Smaller companies are in a weak position to issue debt because of their ability to 
borrow is limited.  
 
Numerous studies have showed evidences that company size affects corporate debt 
policy. The bigger the company the more the funds used to run the operating company 
and one of the source is debt. Large firms can easily access to capital markets. Ease of 
access to capital markets means the company has the flexibility and the ability to obtain 
funding.  
 
Many studies claim that the company's debt policy is affected by the size of the company 
and said there was a positive relationship between firm sizes with the debt ratio. This 
shows that companies tend to increase its debts as they grow bigger. The study Moh'd, 
Perry and Rimbey (1998) found that firm size was positively related and significant effect 
on debt policy. The relationship becomes stronger for larger firms than small firms with 
low growth opportunities (Jaggi & Gul, 1999). In addition, Brigham and Gapenski (1999) 
in Soliha and Taswan (2002) also mentions that the company has high growth rates tend 
to require funding from external sources are great.  
H 4: Firm size has a positive effect on debt policy.  
 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD  
 
3.1. Operational Definition and Measurement of Variables  
3.1.1. Investment Opportunity Set  
Set of investment opportunities is an investment option in the future and reflects the 
growth in assets and equity. Set of investment opportunities can not be observed by an 
external party companies, so that the necessary proxies to measure it. Sharing of the 
investment opportunity set proxies have been used by researchers is based on the price 
proxy, proxy based on investment, proxy-based variant, or use a combination of proxy 
proxy individual.  
 
This research uses a proxy-based pricing in measuring the investment opportunity set, ie 
Market to Book Value of Assets (MBVA). Size using a single set of proxy for investment 
opportunities based on the research Adam and Goyal (2006) which states that Market to 
Book Value of Assets to have better performance with the highest information content in 
assessing the investment opportunity set compared with proxy-proxy set of investment 
opportunities others. Market to Book Value of Assets (MBVA) is calculated by the 







                 (Total Aktivait-Total Equityit)+ (Shares Outstandingit x Closing Priceit) 
MBVA = 
Total Aktivait
• MBVA: Market to Book Value of Assets company  
• Total assets: Total assets owned by company i in period t  
• Total Equity: Total equity-owned company i in period t  
• Shares Outstanding: Number of outstanding shares of company i in period t  
• Closing Price: The closing price of shares of company i at the end of year t  
 
 
3.1.2. Free Cash Flow  
Free cash flow is the company generated cash from operating activities that could be 
distributed to creditors or shareholders who are not used for working capital or 
investment in fixed assets. Free cash flow is measured using the formula Ross, et al 
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(2000) is to subtract the net cash flow from operating activities with net capital 
expenditures and working capital change divided by total assets. The amount of free cash 
flow ratio is then divided by total assets. The smaller the smaller the ratio indicates the 
company is free cash flow used to finance the company's assets. This size is intended to 
make it more comparable for the companies sampled, so the calculation of free cash flow 
to be relative to the size of the company (Rosdini, 2009).  
Free cash flow is calculated by the following formula:  
 




• OCF it: operating cash flow of company i in period t  
• Net capital expenditure it: The end of the acquisition of fixed assets - the value of 
the initial acquisition of fixed assets the company i in period t  
• It Working Capital: The total value of assets - total value of liabilities of the 
company i in period t  
• Changes in working capital it: working capital year-end - start-up capital of 
company i in period t  
 
3.1.3. Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance can be measured by the size of the board of directors and board of 
commissioners, the independence of the commissioner, the turnover of directors and 
corporate ownership structure. In addition, corporate governance can also be measured by 
an index or ranking peruasahaan implementing corporate governance (Hadrat and 
Pujiastuti, 2006). In this study, a measure for corporate governance using an index of 
corporate governance a rating of the application of corporate governance in companies, 
conducted by independent research institute IICG (The Indonesian Institute for Corporate 
Governance) and published by Self magazine Sembada. Each item question asked by 
IICG have a scale from 0 (lowest quality of its corporate governance) to 100 (highest 
quality of its corporate governance), so that the corporate governance index is grouped 
into three title companies are very reliable (score value 85 -100), reliable (score of 70 to 
84.99 value) and fairly reliable (score value of 55 to 69.99). 
 
3.1.4. Firm Size  
Firm size can be expressed in total assets, sales and market capitalization. The larger 
total assets, sales and market capitalization, the greater the size of the company. In this 
study measured firm size using total assets. Firm size is calculated by the following 
formula: 
 
FIRM SIZEit  = Ln Total Aktivait 
 
Where:  
Ln Total Assets it: Natural logarithm of total assets owned by company i in period t  
 
3.1.5. Debt Policy  
Measurement of variable debt policy is to use the debt ratio. This size is chosen based on 
research Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) which states that the debt ratio emphasizes the 
importance of debt financing by showing the percentage of assets backed by debt.  
 
The data for the policy variable debt is calculated by the following formula:  
                      
                              Total Debtit
Debt Ratioiit =  
 Total Aktivait
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Where:  
Debt Ratio   (DR): The ratio of debt the company i in period t  
Total Debt   : Total debt firm i in period t  
Total Assets Total assets owned by company i in period t  
 
3.2. Population and Sample  
The population in this study are all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 
2006-2008. Selection of the sample in this study using purposive sampling method with 
the sampling criteria used are as follows:  
1. Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange included in the rating CGPI 
in 2006-2008, published by Self magazine Sembada.  
2. Companies included in the ranking CGPI publish financial statements for the year 
study period from 2006 to 2008.  
 
If during the observation period, the company only entered the ranking CGPI for one year 
only, then the company is still included in the study sample (pooling data). Based on the 




4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics are part of the data analysis provide the initial gamabaran variables 
used in the study. Descriptive variables used in this study is the average (mean), 
maximum, minimum, and standard deviation of each variable. Dependent variables used 
in this study are presented with debt debt and the independent variables used are the 
investment opportunity set (IOS), free cash flow (FCF), corporate governance (CG) and 





Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Standard Deviation  
Debt  0.5771 0.91 0.21 0.23407 
IOS  1.6719 7.33 0.63 1.10335 
FCF  - 0.0468 0.33 -0.66 0.17955 
CG  76.9794 89.86 56.38 8.03782 
SIZE  29.6907 33.51 22.41 2.13006 
Sources: Secondary data is processed, 2010  
 
From table 1 for the entire sample can be seen that of 52 observations, obtained an 
average value and standard deviation for the policy of debt are 0.5771 and 0.23407. 
Standard deviation values lower than the average value indicates that the policy of the 
company's debt is relatively the same study. The maximum value of 0.91 indicates the 
ratio of the company's largest debt and a minimum value of 0.21 which indicates the ratio 
of the company's smallest debt.  
 
Variable Investment Opportunity Set (IOS) is a proxy used to measure the level of 
corporate growth opportunities. Opportunity to grow the company can be seen from the 
investment opportunity. In this study, the investment opportunity set proxy used is the 
Market to Book Value of Assets (MBVA). IOS proxy has the average value and standard 
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deviation of 1.6719 and 1.10335. These results indicate that the company be sampled in 
this study are not too many investments and investments that do not vary. It can be seen 
from the comparison of the value of standard deviation and the average of less than 1 that 
is equal to 1.10335 (1.6719). The maximum value of 7.33 indicates the ratio of the largest 
investment by the company and the minimum value of 0.63 indicates the ratio of the 
smallest investments made by company.  
 
The variables are free cash flow (FCF) is cash issued by companies to finance projects 
that have a positive NPV is not used for working capital or investment in fixed assets. 
This variable has an average value of -0.0468 and a standard deviation of 0.17955. 
Standard deviation values greater than the average value indicates that the free cash flow 
became a research company that is highly variable and save the company more than 
investing the proceeds in projects profitable and has a positive NPV. The maximum and 
minimum values indicate that the FCF-owned companies with the largest number of 0.33 
and the smallest number is -0.66. Positive direction at the maximum value of FCF 
indicates that the company's operating cash flow is greater than the sum of net capital 
pegeluaran and changes in working capital, negative direction contrary to the minimum 
value of FCF indicates that operating cash flow of the company's lower than the amount 
of net capital expenditures and changes in capital company's work. The maximum and 
minimum values indicate a significant difference in the amount of FCF stored by the 
company that became the study sample.  
 
Variable application score Corporate Governance (CG) sample firms have an average of 
76.9794% with a minimum value of 56.38% and 89.86% of its maximum value. This 
suggests that the quality of the application of corporate governance and the lowest was 
56.38% the highest quality implementation of corporate governance is 89.86%.  
The variable firm size (SIZE) measured by the natural logarithm of total assets showed an 
average value of 29.6907, the value of standard deviation of 2.13006 and a maximum 
value (minimum) of 33.1 (22.41). This shows that the smallest companies had total assets 
of 22.41 and the largest company has total assets of 33.1.  
 
4.2. Univariate analysis  
The analysis was conducted to see the influence of independent variables and the 
dependent variable individually by first grouping the sample into two groups: companies 
that have high IOS and IOS low, companies have free cash flow negative and positive, 
the company that the application of corporate governancenya quite reliable and very 
reliable, and small and large companies. This is done to see if there is a difference 
between corporate debt policies that have a high IOS and IOS low, debt policies among 
companies with free cash flow of negative and positive, between the company's debt 
policy with a CG that is quite reliable and very reliable, as well as between corporate debt 
policy large and small and can be seen by the table below:  
  Table 2 





Category  N  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  
t-test  
Low  33  0.6694  0.22770  4.361 ***  Debt  IOSCAT  
High  19  0.4167  0.14243   
Negative  23  0.5295  0.18146  -1316  Debt  FCF  
Positive  29  0.6149  0.26567   
Quite Reliable  19  0.4793  0.16789  -2.539 **  Debt  CG  
Very Reliable  33  0.6366  0.2478   
Small  27  0.4866  0.20117  -3.140 ***  Debt  SIZE  
Large  25  0.6749  0.23110   
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Sources: Secondary data is processed, 2010  
*** Significant at 1% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
 
From table 2 we can see that debt policy for the group of companies that have high IOS 
and IOS have low average value of debt for high-IOS is 0.4167 and the standard 
deviation of 0.14243, while the average debt for low IOS is 0 , 6694 and the standard 
deviation of 0.22770. This indicates that companies with low growth rates use more debt 
than companies that have high growth rates.  
 
Variables that have the company's debt to free cash flow (FCF) has a negative average 
value and standard deviation of 0.5295 and 0.18146, while the average value and standard 
deviation for positive free cash flow amounted to 0.6149 and 0 , 26 567, which means 
showing that companies that have a positive FCF more use of debt from negative FCF It 
is intended to reduce the agency problem because of the presence of debt can be used to 
control the use of excessive free cash flow by the manager.  
 
The variable debt to companies with the implementation of Corporate Governance (CG) 
is quite reliable to have the average value and standard deviation of 0.4739 and 0.16789, 
while the average value and standard deviation for the implementation of highly reliable 
CG amounted 0.6366 and 0.24798. These results indicate that the level of corporate debt 
by applying very reliable corporate governance is higher than companies with the 
implementation of corporate governance is quite reliable. Application of the better 
corporate governance makes companies increasingly trusted by the creditors, investors 
and other partners. Therefore, the funding originating from companies that debt will 
increase because the company has been trusted lenders so that access to funding sources 
of debt becomes easier.  
 
Variable debt for small firms has a mean value and standard deviation of 0.4866 and 
0.20117, while the average value and standard deviation for large firms is 0.6749 and 
0.23110. These results indicate that large firms have higher debt levels than small firms 
because large firms require more funds to the company's operations.  
 
4.3 Hypothesis Testing and Discussion  
After testing the classical assumptions, it can be concluded that the data is eligible to 
proceed to a regression model that can be used to test the research hypothesis. Table 3 
shows that the set of investment opportunities and the negative effect is statistically 
significant impact on debt policy. This shows if the company has set a high investment 
opportunity the company tend to have lower debt levels. These results support the opinion 
of Myers (1977), which states that companies that grow are more likely to reduce debt 
levels, associated with underinvestment and asset substitution problem. Related to the 
underinvestment problem, managers are more likely not to invest in projects that have 
positive NPV, because the cash flow from the project is first claimed by creditors. 
Substitutions in connection with the problem assets, increase in debt means that some 
company assets will be used as collateral for the debt. In addition to these two problems, 
Myers (1997) stated that the company grew to reduce its debt level to minimize the 
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 Table 3  
Multiple Linear Regression Test Results  













0.013 **  
0.228  
0.028 **  
0.444  
Constant = -0165  
F count = 4275  
Sig F count = 0.005  
** Significant at 5% level  
 
The results of this analysis support the statement of Myers (1977) and Holydia (2004) 
which states that the set of investment opportunities negatively affect debt policy. Set 
chance invetasi negative effect indicates that the company's high growth opportunities 
will be mainly financed with equity capital for investment in more profitable company 
and shareholders tend to want to enjoy these benefits themselves, so that investment 
financed by capital rather than the debt itself. These results contradict the findings 
Puspitasari and Gumanti (2005) which states that the debt policy sets a positive effect on 
investment opportunities in the final expansion stage, mature and decline the company, 
which means the level of corporate debt will increase if the investment opportunity set 
high because the company needs additional funds to make these investments.  
 
Table 3 also shows that free cash flow of no significant impact on debt policy and its 
influence is negative. This indicates that companies with high FCF is more likely to use 
these funds for consumption purposes and the purposes of opportunistic corporate 
managers rather than using those funds for investment. So free cash flow in the study can 
not be proven as a controller of agency problems.  
 
The results of this study is not relevant to the research Agarwal and Jayaraman (1994) 
and Jaggi and Gull (1999) which states that free cash flow and have significant influence 
toward a positive relationship with the lending policies to large companies with low 
growth opportunities, which means the level of debt companies with low growth is high 
when a high free cash flow.  
In addition the study found that corporate governance is a significant positive effect on 
debt policy .. These results indicate that the better the quality of the implementation of 
corporate governance makes companies increasingly trusted by the creditors, investors 
and other partners. Therefore, the funding originating from companies that debt will 
increase because the company has been trusted lenders so that access to funding sources 
of debt becomes easier. From the perspective of shareholders, although the proportion of 
corporate debt to increase, they will not worry because the company that the application 
of corporate governance both will run the principle of transparency, akuntanbilitas, 
responsibility, independence and fairness and equality. So that corporate governance can 
be proved as a controller of the agency problem because the application of corporate 
governance that better indicate the agency problem is low.  
 
The results of this analysis is consistent with research Durnev and Kim (2003), Hadrat 
and Pujiastuti (2007) which states that the quality of corporate governance has a positive 
influence significantly the debt policy. These results are inconsistent with the Black, Jang 
and Kim (2003), Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Harford (2005) mentions the 
existence of a negative relationship between debt policy and quality of corporate 
governance.  
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But the study did not find that company size has a positive effect on debt policy. 
Although no significant effect, but firm size has a positive relationship with the debt 
policy. This indicates that the larger the size of a company will mark more and more 
funds needed to fund the company's business activities and one source is the increase in 
debt. Increasing debt is one mechanism that can control the agency problem because large 
companies have a higher agency problems of small companies. The results of this study 
are consistent with the results of the study Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey (1998), Jaggi & Gul 
(1999), Brigham and Gapenski (1999) in Soliha and Taswan (2002) which states that firm 
size has a positive effect on debt policy.  
4.4. Goodness of Fit Model Test 
F test used to determine whether the model used in the regression has been fit (goodness 
of fit model). Based on the results of data processing, obtained F value calculated for 4275 
and a significance value of 0.005. F value table for k = 4 n = 52 is 2.550. Calculated F value is 
greater than the table F value and significance smaller than 0.05 indicates that the regression 
model created an appropriate regression model, so it can be applied to a population with 
an error rate of 5%.  
 
The value of the coefficient of determination can be seen on multiple linear regression 
test calculations in the table R Square. Based on the results of data processing, obtained 
the value of Adjusted R Square of 0.208 or 20.8%. This means that the influence of 
independent variables is the set of investment opportunities, free cash flow, corporate 
governance and firm size on debt policy (the dependent variable) only amounted to 
20.8% while the remaining 79.2% (100% - 20.8%) influenced by other variables outside 
the model study. Adjusted R Square value of 20.8% showed a low influence of 
independent variables on the dependent variable in the model because this study more 
than half is affected by other variables. Adjusted R Square of low value due to the 




5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATION, AND SUGGESTIONS  
 
5.1 Conclusion  
The company is seen as a set of contracts between corporate managers and shareholders. 
The appointment of managers by shareholders to manage the company in fact often 
encounter problems due to company goals clashed with the manager's personal goals. 
With the competencies of managers can act with the only benefit himself and sacrificing 
the interests of shareholders. This is called the problem of agency (agency problem) and 
the debt policy is a mechanism that can be used to reduce or control the agency problems.  
This research was conducted with the aim to obtain empirical evidence regarding the 
effect of the investment opportunity set, free cash flow, corporate governance and firm 
size on debt policy. This study used a sample of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange and follows the rankings CGPI dlakukan by IICG and published by Self 
magazine Sembada the study period from 2006 to 2008.  
 
Based on the analysis and discussion in the previous chapter, then obtained the following 
conclusion:  
1. The results showed that the investment opportunity set of a significant negative 
impact on debt policy, it indicates that the higher the investment opportunity set, the 
lower the level of debt a company has, since the company more growth opportunities 
financed by equity rather than debt capital.  
2. This study did not find that free cash flow effect on debt policy. Free cash flow which 
has a negative direction indicate that the company has a high free cash flow will have 
lower debt levels. This indicates that companies with high free cash flow is more 
MIICEMA 12th University of Bengkulu  1610 | P a g e  
 
likely to use these funds for consumption purposes and the purposes of opportunistic 
corporate managers rather than using those funds for investment activities.  
3. This study also found that corporate governance is a significant positive effect on 
debt policy This suggests that the better the quality of the implementation of 
corporate governance makes companies increasingly trusted by the creditors, 
investors and other partners. Therefore, the funding originating from companies that 
debt will increase because the company has been trusted lenders so that access to 
funding sources of debt becomes easier. 
4. However, this study found no effect of firm size on debt policy  
 
5.2 Implications of Research Findings  
1. For companies, in making the optimal debt policy considerations influenced the 
company's growth opportunities and corporate governance. If the company has a high 
chance perumbuhan the growth opportunities are more financed with equity capital 
because of high profits with low risk and the benefits tend to be enjoyed by the 
shareholders. If the company's corporate governance is better then the company tends 
to increase the debt because it is easier to access funds from debt sources.  
2. For potential investors, by knowing the rate of growth of a company whether high or 
low, investors may decide to investing or not. If the high growth opportunity, the 
investor can invest in companies the benefits are likely to be high with low risk and 
benefits can be enjoyed by investors.  
3. For creditors, in order to consider the application of corporate governance prior to 
giving loan to the company, ie whether the application of the company's corporate 
governance can be trusted or not. If the company can be trusted then the lender can 
give you a loan because the company will not be detrimental to creditors.  
4. Strengthen the results of previous research which states that the set of investment 
opportunities negatively affect the debt policy and corporate governance have a 
positive effect of debt policy.  
 
5.3 Limitations of Research  
1. This study did not include data for the period of observation in 2009.  
2. This study only measures the investment opportunity set by proxy Market to Book 
Value of Assets (MBVA).  
3. Free cash flow is only measured in one way only so that in the study of free cash flow 
becomes insignificant, and free cash flow is only grouped into positive and negative.  
4. Firm size is measured only in one way only so that firm size is insignificant in this 
study.  
5. R 2 values are low in this study demonstrate the ability of the independent variables in 
explaining the dependent variable is limited.  
 
5.4 Suggestions for Further Research  
1. Future studies are expected to extend the observation period because of corporate 
governance index data for 2009 already exist. Researchers can not enter data in 2009 
because of financial reporting data for 2009 can not be accessed.  
2. Future studies could measure the set of investment opportunities with other proxies 
such as proxied by price, proxies and proxy based on investments based on the 
variant, and based on a combined proxy. It also connects the set of investment 
opportunities with enterprise life cycle.  
3. Future studies could measure the free cash flow by using other means such as means 
used by Jaggi and Gull (1999) and free cash flow can be classified into high and low, 
low free cash flow is below average and above average height.  
4. Future studies can measure firm size by using other means such as those used by 
Andriyani (2006) is by using the size of the total sales.  
5. Future studies may add a new independent variables that could affect the dependent 
variable (policy loans) as dividend payout ratio and the share ownership structure.  
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